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Religious Citizens: On the Relation between Freedom 
of Religion and the Separation of Church and State 
 
Ernst Hirsch Ballin* 
Introduction 
 
Libraries can be filled with publications about the freedom of religion as one of the most 
ancient and best known human rights. Given the usage of the word ‘religion’ in the 
international legal texts, I will not distinguish between religion in the sense of being a member 
of a religious group and religion in the sense of belief. From my article, it will emerge that 
religion can be defined as a conviction about a transcendental truth that can be shared with 
others. Membership then is the expression, belief the foundation of religion. 
 
In the history of the Netherlands, the struggle for freedom of religion was the starting point 
of the revolution against the Habsburg ruler. In the eyes of many, freedom of religion is the 
original point of reference for the constitutional identity of the Netherlands. According to 
Andeweg and Irwin (2009, 6), “religion and politics became enmeshed as the struggle for 
religious freedom became intertwined with the fight to protect traditional political freedoms”. 
 
Whereas churches and other religious institutions usually claim freedom of worship, teaching 
and internal organization vis-à-vis the state, they do not as easily accept freedom of legitimate 
action in politics. The concept of religious institutions is used throughout the chapter in a wide 
sense, including Jewish, Muslim associations, irrespective of the extent to which they have a 
structured organization and membership. Confessional political movements require their 
representatives to implement the moral convictions of their religious community and to 
follow the instructions of its leadership (mainstream Christian- democratic political parties 
are not “confessional” parties; Hirsch Ballin, 2013). This gives rise to tensions with the secular 
character of a polity. According to Leigh and Ahdar (2012, 1069), “[a] key mark of a secular 
state is the attempt to justify public policies and programmes on secular and not religious 
grounds”. 
 
No doubt, religion has a moral significance for the believer that is in principle relevant for all 
his actions, including political action as a citizen. In that sense, it also has a legitimate place in 
a secular democracy. That, however, does not give the believer the right to subjugate others 
to religious prescripts via the force of a political institution. It is everyone's responsibility as a 
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co-citizen to live up to constitutional standards of decision-making that are mutually 
acceptable. As long as the outcome of the political process is compatible with human rights 
standards, the religious citizen has to abide by the rules. Freedom of conscience is with equal 
respect one of the characteristics of secularism (Maclure & Taylor, 2011).  A rejection of a rule 
out of one's own conscience should under certain conditions be respected by the state, but this 
does not suspend the binding character of the rule itself. 
 
In the footsteps of St. Augustine's text on the two cities – the earthly and the heavenly 
(Augustine, 426, Ch. 28) – we could say that man is a sort of double citizen: a citizen of his 
secular community, and one who is aspiring for the City of God. In his introduction to Marcus 
Dods' translation, Thomas Merton (2000, xx) takes a view on the relation between the two 
cities that whoever is concerned about the shortcomings of earthly cities may take to heart: 
“Nevertheless, the fact that the two cities are opposed to one another does not mean that they 
cannot peacefully co-exist here on earth. It is not impossible that they should agree upon a 
modus vivendi. They can come to terms, and it is well that they should do so. The temporal 
advantage of worldly society is well served when the citizens of heaven still living in the 
world are protected by the temporal power. And although the Church as a whole can only 
profit by persecution, nevertheless temporal peace is a greater blessing, and one to be prayed 
and worked for, since it provides the normal condition under which most men can safely 
expect to work out their eternal destiny”. 
Beyond the Separation of Church and State 
 
The ‘separation of church and state’ is a valuable template for the avoidance of conflicts 
between religious and secular obligations. Its meaning is that the state should neither meddle 
in the internal affairs of the church, nor the church(es) of that state. It is regarded as a 
precondition for the freedom of religion because it protects the independence of the churches 
and other religious institutions. At the same time, it asserts the democratic nature of the 
constitution, free from privileged influences. In the realities of our time, we might need a few 
more of these principles, e.g. a ‘separation of state and industry’. For example, why do we 
think that it is inappropriate for a bishop to be member of the Senate, but accept a chairperson 
of an employers' organization sitting on the Senate floor? In the United Kingdom a different 
situation exists, where bishops of the Church of England are by law members of the Upper 
House. 
 
The origins of the separation principle are very clear though. The separation between church 
and state protects the freedom of religion from an institutional perspective. One of its 
purposes is to assure equal religious freedom. The state and the religious institutions refrain 
from attempts to control each other's internal affairs, and, as a consequence of its secular 
identity, the state will not privilege or disenfranchise anyone because of his or her religion. 
 
We will first discuss its merits and implications, and then turn to the reasons why, in these 
times, a more sophisticated understanding of the relationship between religious and secular 
obligations is required. 
 
Many European countries had an official church. Some of them still have, but with limited 
practical significance. The influence could go both ways, e.g. state approval for the 
nomination of bishops or ecclesiastical competence in certain areas of legislation. Into the 19th 
century, the Pope and some German bishops had their own states. Historically, the separation 
principle served equal treatment of all citizens and the full realization of democratic 
governance. The first step on the road towards acceptance of religious pluralism was the 
‘recognition’ of other religious institutions, sometimes next to the (formerly) official church. 
Several European democracies had (like the Netherlands until the last quarter of the 20th 
century) or have (like Hungary) such a system of registration, respectively, recognition. The 
Hungarian system was abused when Parliament excluded nine formerly recognized churches 
(Egyház and Others v. Hungary, 2014). Other states, like France, view the absence of any official 
relation as the consequence of a strictly secular model. 
 
Across all these differences most of the systems have one thing in common: religious freedom 
was viewed in the first place as the liberty to choose the religious community of their own 
preference (Sharma, 2011). The phenomenon of official churches and its opposite, the 
separation of church and state, reflected a situation where being religious was synonymous 
to belonging to a group, i.e. being a member of a specific church or other religious institution. 
Equal treatment irrespective of one's religion (or even not having a religion) and equal 
religious freedom are ensured by the constitution of democratic states and various 
international legal documents, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) 
(Article 18), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) (Article 18 with 
CCPR General Comment No.22:Article 18, Freedom of Thought (1993)), the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) (Article 
9) and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the Europeans Union (Article 10). Article 18 
ICCPR reads as follows: 
 
“1.  Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This 
right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice, and 
freedom, either individually or in community with others and in public or private, to 
manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching. 
  2.  No one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his freedom to have or to  
adopt a religion or belief of his choice. 
3.  Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs may be subject only to such limitations 
as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or 
morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others. 
4.  The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to have respect for the liberty of 
parents and, when applicable, legal guardians to ensure the religious and moral 
education of their children in conformity with their own convictions.” 
 
In these modern texts, the emphasis has shifted from the protected position of churches to an 
individual right. According to General Comment No. 22 on Article 18 ICCPR (1993, para. 4, 
last sentence), the protection of the churches and other religious institutions can be derived 
from this human right: “In addition, the practice and teaching of religion or belief includes 
acts integral to the conduct by religious groups of their basic affairs, such as the freedom to 
choose their religious leaders, priests and teachers, the freedom to establish seminaries or 
religious schools and the freedom to prepare and distribute religious texts or publications”.
 
The relation between a church or other religious institution and its individual members is 
presupposed in this approach, but it is not the subject of any regulation. This can be 
regarded as a consequence of the religious freedom of the religious institutions: their inner 
organization is not regulated by civil law, but by their inner (e.g. ecclesiastical) regulations 
(cf. Art. 2:2 Dutch Civil Code; Warendorf et al., 2009). 
 
Rituals, especially initiation rites and rites of transition at important life events, play an 
important role here (Hirsch Ballin, 2012). According to Bryan Turner (2011), “the core 
meaning of the Abrahamic religions was established by the Old Testament prophets and by 
the early Christian community to signify a body of people drawn  together by belief in a 
monotheistic God and held together by rituals, especially dietary practices and sacrifice”. 
They confirm the inclusive relation between the religious community and the individual. 
The religious community offers him or her protection and the solidarity of the group in 
situations of need. In the absence of alternatives like state welfare, members of religious 
communities may feel pressure to comply with the rules and rituals of their group, even to 
the extent that their religious freedom is impaired. The state will in principle abstain from 
any interference. 
 
Such pressures have faded away in most western democracies, but still exist or became even 
more severe in less developed societies. The success of the Muslim Brotherhood in North 
Africa and beyond, and of evangelical sects in Latin America derives at least partly from 
their ability to provide welfare and education to the downtrodden. The specific history of a 
country can also play a role. The Republic of Turkey views itself as having a ‘laic’ 
constitution; until recently a strictly secular constitutional identity prevailed in politics. 
Because of its past and of fears that Islamic clergy could take over, part of its constitutional 
setup involved – ever since the abolition in 1924 of the Caliphate – the exclusion of 
competing religious authorities from indirect power, through the establishment of an 
agency in charge of Sunni Muslim institutionalized religion, the Diyanet Işleri Başkanlığı 
(Somer, 2012). Article 136 of the Turkish Constitution provides for this body: “The 
Presidency of Religious Affairs, which is within the general administration, shall exercise 
its duties prescribed in its particular law, in accordance with the principles of secularism, 
removed from all political views and ideas, and aiming at national solidarity and integrity”. 
 
We may conclude that the separation of church and state is an important, but not in itself 
sufficient protection of personal freedom in the domain of religion. The actual realization of 
freedom of religion requires the availability to the individual of alternative possibilities to 
maintain his or her social and economic subsistence in the unfolding of his or her life project. 
When, in 1917, the Dutch constitution integrated religiously-instituted schools in the 
state-sponsored educational system, it also introduced a constitutional guarantee that in 
every community public education as a neutral alternative would be available (Art. 23 of 
the Constitution for the Kingdom of the Netherlands). 
 
A strict separation of state and church would leave these matters to be decided within the 
community, given everyone's right to determine at what point he or she will prefer to leave 
this community. But is that really sufficient as a guarantee for personal freedom? Freedom 
of religion depends not only on the absence of powers that interfere in their religious life, but 
also in the presence of institutions that protect them from undesired inclusion. 
 
 
Severing the bonds with a community may put oneself in social isolation. This is often the 
case when essential social services like education and welfare depend on religious 
institutions. The constitutional identity of the state as an Islamic state or, until recently, a 
Christian state may serve as the justification for such practices, but de facto dominance of a 
certain religion can amount to similar results. Being excluded from the religious community 
may amount to someone's civil death; even worse are situations where leaders or tribunals 
of the religious community may impose physical punishment or the death penalty in cases 
of apostasy (BBC, 2014; Law Library of Congress Global Legal Research Center, 2014). Such 
an abhorrent breach of human rights is not justified by Islam either. According to Abdullahi 
Ahmed An-Na'im (2008, 122): “there should be no penal or other negative legal consequences 
for apostasy and all of the related concepts from an Islamic perspective, because belief in 
Islam presupposes and requires the freedom of choice and can never be valid under coercion 
or intimidation”. 
 
Such situations compromise religious freedom and contrast with the actual self-
understanding of the person as a subject free to choose and to relate with other persons. The 
availability of support when needed from neutral or freely chosen service providers 
(including hospitals and schools) is a necessary precondition for the freedom to leave or stay 
outside a religious community. From the viewpoint of a religion true to its transcendent 
vocation, insincerity is equally undesirable. In the West, a prejudice exists that Islam does not 
care about forced ‘conversions’, pointing at the dire practices of Taliban, Al-Shabaab, Boko 
Haram and the so-called Islamic State. Some remember that history of Christianity was not 
honorific either: after the Reconquista of Andalucia (Al-Andalus), Muslims and Jews were 
forced to ‘convert’ to Christianity or face punishment and expulsion. For the Christian 
churches, this is something of a painful past. Authoritative Muslim leadership equally 
confirms that conversion can never be imposed by force (Open Letter to Dr. Ibrahim Awwad 
Al-Badri, 2014). An-Na'im (2008, 1, 125-128) even goes one step further: he demonstrates that 
in Islam itself a preference can be found for the secular state as the best context for a truly free 
life in faith (“[i]n order to be a Muslim by conviction and free choice”) and underlines the 
significance of equal citizenship. 
 
The freedom to change one's religion, guaranteed in the ICCPR and other international 
documents, appears to be a freedom to adhere to a different pre-existing religious institution. 
A growing number of people in modem society do not wholesale accept the teachings and 
prescripts of a religious institution anymore (Joas, 2012). To them, religious freedom is also 
the personal freedom towards the shared points of reference (like revelations, prophecies, 
holy texts and holy places) to which they relate their religious identity. In other words: 
religious identity is not necessarily submission, but part of one's autonomy. This is what 
Russell Sandberg (2014, 223) has called the “subjective turn” in our understanding of freedom 
of religion. 
Freedom of Religion in a Comprehensive Human Rights Context 
 
The preceding paragraph has shown that the interpretation of freedom of religion as the 
freedom to accept or change a religion will not suffice in the face of social and economic 
pressures to join or not to leave a certain community. The confirmation of “the freedom to 
change one's religion” in the treaty provisions is insufficient. A full realization of personal 
freedom of religion depends on the overall freedom of the person. It is part of someone's 
human security, in the broad sense that people have “the right to live in freedom and dignity, 
 
free from poverty and despair with an equal opportunity to enjoy all their rights and fully 
develop their human potential” (UNGA Res 66/290, 2010). 
 
This transformation of the freedom of religion reflects a transformation of the role of religion 
in society. Against the common belief that secularization has gradually diminished the role 
of religion and that religion is fading away in modem societies, Hans joas (2012, 42, 152) 
argues that secularization and the encounter in modem urbanized societies with a 
multiplicity of religions, have transfonned the social meaning of religion. Religion is no longer 
a 'given' frame of reference for a more or less united group of believers, but rather an option 
that has to coexist with other religious options. This diversity might neverthe- less build a 
united front against nationalist and racist enemies of universalism (Joas, 2012, 224-225). 
 
Doug Saunders (2012, 153) arrives at a similar conclusion in his recent book about ‘The Myth 
of the Muslim Tide’. Even where in the Arab World confessional movements like the Muslim 
Brotherhood have gained much influence, their leadership is actually not a restoration of 
former religious bonds, but rather “a politically conservative movement among a range of 
political choices”. Salafists and other fundamentalists fill a gap, in Germany and other 
European countries, created by feelings of exclusion among youngsters, deepening instead 
of healing the rifts in the society (Abdel-Samad, 2014, 102). The deciding point is not the call 
to violence, but their view on man and society. They are playing the identity card, inciting 
people to identify themselves in an exclusive manner with a specific ethnicity or religion 
(Abdel-Samad, 2014, 105). This is especially dangerous whenever the self-confident 
affirmation of this identity goes hand in hand with contempt against other identities (Sen, 
2006; Maalouf, 1998). Abuses of religious identities are the most dangerous of all, since they 
can pit their followers against each other in ‘holy wars’, which are often even more ferocious 
then other wars because of the expectancy of a post-mortal reward for fallen fighters (on 
religious wars, cf. Armstrong, 2014). In this exploitation of religious feelings, both 
international legal norms and religious pre- scripts are trampled on, as we learn from the 
accurate analysis of both international law and Sunni Muslim legal and religious doctrine by 
M. Cherif Bassiouni (2014), (Joas, 2012, 182). 
 
Just like any other legal concept the freedom of religion is in a continuing process of 
"iterations" (Benhabib, 2006, 48) to be re-interpreted and redefined. Religious freedom is thus 
going through new iterations from the freedom to be included in a ritually conformed 
community (in which religious authorities define their own powers) into a freedom to choose 
and articulate one's religion. Viewing freedom of religion as a right of the person is in the 
light of the changed socio-economic realities essentially more than the affirmation of an 
abstract, individual right. The neutrality of the state in its arbitrating and supporting 
functions is indispensable. Some of the traditional tenets of the separation of church and state 
have therefore to be reconsidered. This is the case with legalistic roofing over religious 
practices. Religious courts – churches as well as Islamic communities have them – may serve 
an equitable response to life questions, but must not display a compelling parallel structure 
that keeps people away from invoking their rights in a state court. The attempts to widen the 
reach of the hybrid religious Körperschaften des öffentlichen Rechts (religious bodies that under 
a transitional provision in Article 140 of the German Constitution can be established  under 
public law (Epping, 2012, 140-141)) would further diminish the – still incomplete – separation 
of state and church in Germany and bolster conservative voices (Abdel-Samad, 2014, 111, 
114). The persons appointed by their religious institution as a judge must therefore view their 
task as a specific pastoral service, bringing peace in conflict situations, not as religious law 
enforcement. Safeguarding the freedom of religion and conscience requires some state 
 
supervision: everyone should feel free to accept or not to accept the jurisdiction of the judges 
of their religious institution. 
Religious Citizenship 
 
Meanwhile, many religious institutions struggle with the extent to which they should accept 
an increasingly self-defining adherence to their religion, and to what extent belonging to the 
community can be a process of mutual under- standing instead of mere submission. It is 
basically the same process that changed political life in the course of the 19th and the 20th 
centuries. Authoritarian regimes have gone through the same process in many states during 
the 19th and 20th century: emancipation of the downtrodden and recognition of everyone's 
innate human dignity (Joas, 2011/2013) cannot be stopped. Freedom of religion requires 
therefore not only an institutional separation, but also a public structure that warrants equal 
rights in the other dimensions of living together. It is a dimension – condition and 
consequence at the same time – of the full enjoyment of human rights and citizens' rights 
(Hirsch Ballin, 2014). As a person whose dignity is protected by the law, the citizen has the 
right to be a religious person in the context that he or she accepts and creates, and maybe 
redefines over time (Thierse, 2000). Freedom is more than a bundle of rights: it is the power 
of every person to develop his or her life project in a society. 
 
The context of life projects, protected and supported by human rights, in our times is a world 
‘on the move’: ongoing migration to the cities brings people together from different origins, 
with different convictions. Under the 21st century conditions of migration and urbanization, 
people move around and co-create their changing social fabric. Many of the oppressed people 
and - consequently - of the refugees all over the world have suffered from a lack of protection 
(or even acceptance) of their citizenship on religious grounds, or pretended religious grounds 
as a guise for power hunger. Room for religious diversity is for them a natural requirement 
of living together. 
 
Interesting here is the Canadian example. Bruce Ryder (2008, 87) claims in his chapter on ‘The 
Canadian Conception of Equal Religious Citizenship’ that “in a number of important ways, 
Canada takes a more robust approach to equal religious citizenship than can be found in the 
human rights jurisprudence of many other countries”. Commenting a landmark case in the 
Canadian Supreme Court (O'Malley v Simpsons-Sears, 1985), Ryder (2008, 90) comes to the 
conclusion that “[w]ithout the ability to demand that neutral rules and policies be adjusted 
to meet their religious needs, people of faith cannot participate equally in social and economic 
life”. At the same time, however, it is recognized “that religious equality rights are not 
absolute; they will have to give way in the face of competing rights and interests”. 
 
What is needed in contemporary society is a mutual willingness of political actors and 
religious leaders to engage in a dialogue, respectful of each other's responsibilities, aiming at 
an understanding of how religious freedom and democratic legitimacy can be brought to 
terms. In Catholicism, the authoritative ‘Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church’ 
recommends a “method of discernment”, “structured around certain key elements” 
including analysis “with the help of social sciences”, reflection “in the light of the Gospel and 
the Church's social teaching”, and “identification of choices” (Pontifical Council for Justice 
and Peace, 2005, para. 568; Hirsch Ballin, 2013). 
 
 
Religion is a contribution to a vital civil society. It should not be a tranquillizer (as it often has 
been, in the service of the ruling class). Because it expresses itself in moral categories, it is a 
more productive source of unrest than the superficial bashing of the elite by ‘social’ media. 
The role of the citizen is pivotal in a free society that has organized itself as a democratic state 
on the basis of the rule of law (Hirsch Ballin, 2014, 141). Religion is, at least in the self-
understanding of the believer, fundamental to his or her personal identity. A religious person 
(who may be a believer or a non-believer) rejects any self-deification. Religion, in this 
encompassing meaning, doesn't replace the ‘political’ nature of man that makes him a citizen. 
Rather, it is an unassuming way to strive for perfection in the service of others. 
Conclusion 
 
Respecting the role of religion in a free, democratic constitutional context is not self-
contradictory. In the view of Jürgen Habermas (2006, 9-10), a post-secular society must 
include religious voices: “all that is required here is the epistemic ability to consider one's 
own faith reflexively from the outside and to relate it to secular views. Religious citizens can 
well recognize this ‘institutional translation proviso’ without having to split their identity 
into a public and a private part the moment they participate in public discourses”. Secularist 
ideologies have given way to a secular state that appears to be compatible with an acceptance 
of freedom in faith. This was also the starting point for the Muslim scholar An-Na'im. Present 
day tensions around all varieties of fundamentalism underline the importance of such a 
different approach. Even in France, the country from which the idea of a strictly secular state 
originates and where the principle of laicité is firmly rooted in constitutional theory, new 
approaches emphasizing the value of a free dialogue have emerged since the late 20th century 
(Gauchet, 1998). 
 
Only a humane religion, i.e. a religion that accepts the condition humaine of diverse human 
beings living together, is what we can have in mind when we recognize freedom of religion 
as a human right. Specific “public theologies” might justify a view on citizenship that 
excludes followers of other beliefs. See the article by Sandal (2013) for an analysis of the 
impact of “public theology” on shortcomings in equal citizenship in Turkey. Does this mean 
that the freedom of religion can only protect some religions, not all, irrespective of their 
tenets? Peter Danchin (2006, 415) has – in the view developed here, rightly – criticized 
international law scholars for their acceptance of a problematic view on religion: “Human 
rights law (...) has deferred to religious despotism in the private sphere through the definition 
of religion as a 'sovereign, extralegal jurisdiction in which inequality is not only accepted, but 
expected’.” 
 
Our answer to this delicate question must be precise. Indeed, not every ideology that claims 
to be a religion deserves protection. I reject the idea of such an ‘absolute’ freedom of religion. 
Think for instance of the tenets of the so-called Islamic State, an example which might be 
supplemented by many other religions in all parts of the world. An ‘absolute’ interpretation 
of the freedom of religion would run as follows. The so-called caliph (assuming this title 
without wide consensus among Muslims was actually an act of heresy according to the Open 
Letter to Dr. Ibrahim Awwad Al-Badri, 2014, para. 22) would have the right to teach that 
mankind should live in a political system in which every deviation from the teachings he 
endorses is to be subject to severe punishment He and his followers are however not entitled 
to put these teachings into practice because that would infringe upon the human rights of 
others, and the dissemination of these teachings would in many jurisdictions have to be 
 
qualified as incitement to hatred and violence against others on the basis of group 
characteristics, i.e. a crime. What sense then would it make to call this a religion that is 
protected under human rights, if its very core is not acceptable under a human rights regime, 
which by its nature first and foremost protects the freedom to live together in peace and 
dignity? 
 
This apparent aporia reveals to us what we actually have in mind when we talk about 
freedom of religion: not any claim about an absolute truth, but a view (set of convictions) on 
the transcendental dimension of humanity. According to Rafael Domingo (2013, 452), “all 
legal systems should be open to transcendence as a constitutive element of the legal approach 
to religious freedom”. Ideologies that promote violence at the expense of human dignity do 
not qualify for protection by human rights. In a commonwealth, where people live together 
under the reciprocal recognition of human rights – a democratic state under the rule of law – 
being religious does not diminish one's rights and obligations as a citizen, nor does 
citizenship diminish the possibility of hearing a religious vocation (Habermas, 2008, on the 
legitimate place of religion in a secular (but not a secularist) state). Hearing and listening is, 
according to Karl Rahner's (1971) Christian anthropology what defines man in his or her 
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